The issue is can the Supreme Court (SC) issue writs of injunction or prohibition to restrain criminal prosecutions? It stems from the SC’s denial of Senator Ronald “Bato” Dela Rosa’s request for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The TRO aims to prevent the government from arresting him on a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
It can be recalled that Dela Rosa, then Philippine National Police (PNP) chief, was charged as a co-perpetrator of former President Rodrigo Duterte. The basis of the charge, which is crime against humanity, is the deaths of at least 32 people; allegedly killed between July 2016 and April 2018. This is in line with “Oplan Double Barrel” anti-drug campaign during the Duterte administration.
Now, can the Supreme Court issue writs of injunction or prohibition to restrain the criminal prosecutions (of Senator Bato)?
As a general rule under OCA Circular No. 79-2003, courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecutions. The rationale for this rule, as held by the SC in Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90 (1992), being public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of the society, except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.
In BPI v. Hon. Hontanosas, Jr., G.R. No. 157163 (2014), the SC held that injunction may issue upon a clear showing that the applicant has a right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such right. In extreme cases as provided in OCA Circular No. 79-2003, the court may issue writs of injunction or prohibition to restrain criminal prosecution when:
- The injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional right of the accused;
- It is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
- There is prejudicial question that is sub judice;
- The acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
- The prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
- Double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
- The court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
- It is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
- The charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
- There is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
The Court met a real philosophical divide when it reached 9-5-1 vote against granting the TRO. The rationale for such denial was the alleged absence of a clear and unmistakable right” that needed immediate protection through a TRO. The justices also said that the alleged threats to his rights were “more imagined than real”. The majority side pushed that the Court should not stop enforcement unless a clear legal right already exists and imminent injury is clearly established. Whereas, the dissenting side countered that the constitutional uncertainty itself is the reason interim protection should be granted.
Among the nine (9) who voted on the denial of the TRO were: Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa. For him, dela Rosa failed to show (a) He A clear legal right; (b) An actual invasion of that right; and (3) Entitlement to extraordinary relief pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. He espouses the belief that the ICC jurisdiction remains operative, as Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides. The withdrawal of the Philippines does not extinguish matters already under consideration. Hence, the ICC warrant is presumptively valid. Caguioa repeatedly reminds readers that due process belongs not only to the accused but also to victims and their families.
Moreover, Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh believed that the (a) TRO standards are strict; (b) the requisites have not yet been satisfied; and (c) the Court should avoid prematurely resolving merits issues through an interim order. Justice Rodil V. Zalameda emphasized the (a) limited scope of TRO review; (b) preserving determination of the merits for the principal case; and (c) insufficient basis for emergency intervention.
Interestingly, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen did not appear to say Dela Rosa has no rights at all. “The right may exist, but there is still no sufficient showing of a material and substantial invasion requiring injunctive relief. No court should enjoin law enforcement in advance of its exercise.”
However, the five (5) dissenters were Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando. He rejected the idea that ICC has authority/jurisdiction, as the same is highly contestable and unresolved. Hernando claimed that no Filipino should be arrested and surrendered to an international tribunal without Philippine legal authority and Philippine judicial process. He argued that (a) there is no Philippine court warrant; and (b) There is no Philippine judicial proceeding authorizing surrender. Thus, arrest and transfer would violate constitutional protections. He feared that once arrested, Dela Rosa could be immediately transferred abroad before local remedies become meaningful.
Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier placed stronger emphasis on (a) liberty interests; (b) due process protections; and (c) presumption of innocence. “The Court should preserve constitutional safeguards before allowing surrender to an international tribunal.”
Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting dealt heavily on sovereignty, such as (a) Philippine constitutional structures; (b) limits on foreign or international processes; (c) necessity of domestic legal authority.
Justice Ricardo R. Rosario was more protective of interim relief, given the unresolved jurisdictional questions of the ICC.
Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. was the most institutionalist among the dissenters, if not patriotic. “When fundamental constitutional questions remain unresolved, the safer judicial course may be: Preserve the status quo first. Then decide the merits later.” This is a classic equity-based approach to injunctions.